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Abstract. Traditional networking is being progressively replaced by
Software Defined Networking (SDN). It is a new promising approach to
designing, building and managing networks. In comparison with tradi-
tional routed networks, SDN enables programmable and dynamic net-
works. Although it promises more flexible network management, one
should be aware of current and upcoming security threats accompa-
nied with its deployment. Our goal is to analyze SDN accompanied with
OpenFlow protocol from the perspective of Distributed Denial of Service
attacks (DDoS). In this paper, we outline our research questions related
to an analysis of current and new possibilities of realization, detection
and mitigation of DDoS attacks in this environment.
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1 Introduction
Even though computing has advanced over the past decades, the networking
principles have remained mostly unchanged. Traditional networks are built us-
ing switches and routers. Every vendor uses a proprietary operating system and
configuration in these network devices. Emerging clouds and Internet of Things
demand scalable and dynamic networks. However, building a suitable network
with centralized management in such a heterogeneous environment is very ex-
pensive. One new architecture that replaces traditional networking is Software
Defined Networking (SDN). SDN abstracts network control from the underlying
infrastructure of the network. This abstraction enables applications and net-
work services to treat the network as one logical entity. This could increase the
potential for the better mitigation of security threats.
A DDoS attack is an attempt to make a network or server resource unavail-
able to its intended users. The attack is relatively easy to perform, hard to defend
against, and the attacker is rarely traced back. The target of a DDoS attack could
be any online business, government or critical infrastructure. Increasing numbers
of DDoS attacks in current networks also increases the awareness of them and
makes them a major threat to today’s networks. The deployment of SDN will
not stop attackers, however, it could make mitigation techniques more effective
and their deployment more flexible.
Our research will be dedicated to an analysis of security challenges in SDN
from the point of view of DDoS attacks. Although SDN promises more flexible
network management, one should be aware of current and upcoming security
threats accompanied with the deployment of SDN. The abstraction of data and
control plane devices introduces new potential threats.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 briefly
describes the state of the art in SDN. Section 3 states our hypothesis and research
questions. Section 4 outlines the scientific approach. Section 5 summarizes this
paper.
2 Software Defined Networking
SDN is an emerging network architecture. It is supported by many large com-
panies listed on Open Networking Foundation1 list [3], e. g., Google [4] or Cisco
Systems [2]. SDN is based on the abstraction of a data plane from a control
plane. This abstraction makes networks more programmable and flexible. Fig-
ure 1 describes the basic SDN architecture.
The control plane consists of one or more SDN controllers. The controller
maintains a global view of the network. It defines the forwarding rules of the
devices in the data plane and performs all complex functions. All devices in
the data plane are remotely configured by the controller via well-known and
vendor-neutral API. It allows the controller to manage different types of devices
from different vendors. The data plane contains simple forwarding devices, e. g.,
switches. From the point of view of the controller, devices in the data plane could
act as a single logical entity. These devices forward all traffic according to rules
in flow tables. If there is not a matching forward rule for a packet, the packet is
forwarded to the controller. The communication between the controller and data
plane devices needs a suitable standard. Such standard seems to be the widely
supported OpenFlow protocol [6]. It provides an open and standard way for a
controller to direct communication with a network device in the data plane.
Many SDN and OpenFlow security challenges have been proposed in the
literature [8]. We will focus on DDoS attacks since they have become a major
threat in modern-day networks. Due to the centralization of controller and flow
table limitations in data plane devices, there is an increased potential for new
DDoS attacks in SDN networks as well.
3 Hypothesis and Research Questions
Our hypothesis is that SDN provides an ideal platform for distributed detection
and mitigation of DDoS attacks. SDN emerges as a promising network paradigm.
The new concept of networking guarantees programmable and dynamic net-
works. They could react faster and with better efficiency to necessary changes in
1 The organization dedicated to the promotion of SDN through open standards devel-
opment
Fig. 1. Software Defined Networking architecture schema
networking. This could help to mitigate the DDoS attack. However, the attacks
could also take advantage of the overhead of the SDN controller. We split our
research into the following three research questions:
1. What differences does SDN bring compared to traditional networks and its
monitoring?
This research question aims to gain an understanding of SDN that separates
the networking into the data and control plane. We will analyze and compare
the differences between SDN and current networks. The research will also
cover the analysis of monitoring possibilities in SDN.
2. What are SDN specific security vulnerabilities both on the data and con-
trol planes? In particular, what known or new vulnerabilities of SDN can be
abused by attackers in DDoS attacks?
The goal of this question is to analyze possible abusive attributes of the data
and control plane. At first, we will focus on open-source solutions, e. g., Open
vSwitch [1]. We will analyze possibilities of DDoS attacks abusing data and
control plane devices as a bottleneck, reflector or amplifier. Abstraction of
the control plane from the data plane might cause serious overhead when
there are too many requests from the data plane. Also the misconfiguration
or direct abuse of the central controller or one of the data plane devices could
cause denial of network access for users.
3. How to optimally mitigate DDoS attacks in Software Defined Networks?
The main goal of this question is to find a method to optimally mitigate
spoofed and non-spoofed DDoS attacks in a SDN environment. We will an-
alyze different DDoS attack methods and propose the optimal way for miti-
gating attacks. We will also pay attention to the trace-back of the source of
an attack using the advantages of the SDN architecture.
4 Scientific Approach
In our research, we will focus on security challenges in DDoS attacks detection
and mitigation in SDN environment. At first, we will create a state of the art
in SDN network monitoring and security. This analysis will provide required
understanding of the SDN and related issues.
Next, we will analyze attack, defense and monitoring mechanisms in current
networks and the possibility of their deployment in SDN environment. Monitor-
ing is nowadays mostly done at the host or network level in attacked networks.
There are many variants of DDoS attacks as well as defense mechanisms against
them proposed for current networks [10]. We believe that those methods could
be adopted in SDN. Flow-based techniques are mostly used for the detection of
DDoS attacks. Due to the flow-based nature of SDN, it is possible to make detec-
tions in both planes. However, detection mechanisms deployed in the controller
without proper aggregation of network traffic could overload the communication
among control and data plane. Also, the flow table in a network device has lim-
itations. Shin et al. [9] proposed that some of these issues could be resolved by
adding some minimal intelligence to the data plane devices.
The main goal of our research is to mitigate the attack using SDN architec-
ture. For the sake of simplicity, we consider two groups of DDoS attacks. The first
group targets the computing power. The second group exceeds available band-
width. The first group could be mitigated using a SDN infrastructure of the
attacked organization. We could use all network devices as one logical switch
to load balance the network traffic through the network. This load balancing
of attack traffic gives us the possibility to configure as many filtering rules as
possible to maximize the amount of dropped malicious traffic. However, for the
second group, this option is not effective. We have to stop the attack closer to
the source of traffic, e. g., country of origin, or ISP of the attack source. Even
though this mitigation technique requires a cooperation of involved providers
in the route of the attack and complex reconfiguration of ISP routing tables,
the flexible SDN environment could make this reconfiguration easier. The first
SDN application that programs networks for DoS security against network flood
attacks is Radware DefenseFlow [7]. However, it is not a “pure” SDN solution
and it still has to cooperate with dedicated mitigation hardware.
At last, to prove our hypotheses, we will prepare a pure SDN infrastructure.
We will use an environment prepared in Cybernetic Proving Ground (CPG)
project [5]. In this environment, we will create set of synthetic and real traffic
based data sets and experimentally verify the hypothesis.
5 Summary
Research questions 1 and 2 aim to obtain a thorough understanding of SDN in
the context of DDoS attacks. It is crucial to understand SDN for answering the
third research question. Our goal in research question 3 is to find the optimal way
to mitigate DDoS attack using the SDN infrastructure. The main goal should
be achieved within a period of three years as a part of a PhD thesis.
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